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An EU Security Strategy:  
An Attractive Narrative 
Jo Coelmont 
In  today’s  ever  more  complex  world,  a 
European Security Strategy (ESS) is needed 
to  preserve  our  European  values  and 
interest, our European way of life – and the 
Union as such. 
 The EU is in dire straits. The European project 
has lost a lot of its appeal, in the first place in 
the eyes of EU citizens themselves. In the rest 
of the world as well, the process of European 
integration  is  no  longer  perceived  as  an 
attractive  model.  Yet  not  that  long  ago t h e  
opposite was true. At the time of the European 
Convention,  politicians  and  experts  showed 
great enthusiasm to revise the Treaties. Never 
before  it  seemed,  was  there  such  a  strong 
momentum for integration. For the reasons we 
all know, that momentum was lost in a painfully 
drawn-out  ratification  process.  That  the 
eventual  Lisbon  Treaty  is  not  actually  that 
different  from  the  draft  Constitutional  Treaty 
does matter – but only for decision-makers and 
technocrats  directly  involved  in  its 
implementation. Much more important is that a 
number  of  European  politicians  went  into 
waiting  mode,  adopting  a  critical  or  even 
outright negative attitude towards the process 
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of  European  integration.  In  this  they  were 
followed by a share of public opinion. Indeed, 
a fertile breeding ground for cheap populism 
was created. The basic undercurrent remained 
untouched:  the  belief  that  step  by  step  an 
attractive European project could yet be built, 
whether  through  supranational  or 
intergovernmental  means.  But  soon 
afterwards, this fundamental vision on Europe 
came under pressure as well as a result of the 
financial,  budgetary  and  then  economic 
debacle  that  Europe  is  now  struggling  with. 
Even  worse,  it  has  now  become  generally 
accepted that a systemic error in the process of 
European integration is part of the problem. 
Apparently,  we  did  not  follow  the  right 
strategy.  
 
There is a systemic error indeed, and it has a 
fundamental cause. If in a number of areas the 
Union is failing, as it is now being suggested, 
the  first  question  should  be:  what  is  its 
objective?  Monetary  union,  economic 
governance,  a  central  bank:  these  are  mere 
instruments. A strategy can only be corrected 
if the objective is clear. For a sui generis actor 
like the EU, the answer to that question is not 
self-evident.  European  integration  came  into 
No. 34 
 March 2012   2 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
being  on  the  basis  of  a  very  general  vision 
shared  by  a  core  of  influential  politicians.  In 
order to give the process a chance of success, 
they  chose  not  to  define  an  end-state  of 
cooperation  and  integration,  let  alone  a  clear 
strategy  with  explicit  benchmarks  and  timing. 
They  opted  for  the  “Méthode  Monnet”,  to 
which  they  added  one  principle,  that  of 
subsidiarity.  In  practice  that  means  that 
competence in a policy area is only transferred 
to the Union when the damage suffered by the 
individual Member States is too high and the 
responsible politicians have become desperate 
and  have  nowhere  else  to  turn  to.  Just  one 
objective  was  rendered  explicit:  “no 
more  war  between  European 
countries”. That was a powerful signal 
to  everybody,  politicians  and  citizens 
alike.  On  this  objective,  there  was  a 
general  consensus.  In  it,  Europe  had 
found its attractive narrative.  
 
Looking back, it can be said that this 
simple  construction  has  proved  its 
usefulness.  Apparently,  it  was  fit  for 
purpose – during the very specific, and 
historically  seen  atypical  period  of  the  Cold 
War. For four decennia the geopolitical balance 
remained nearly unchanged. The foreign policy 
of European countries was directed mostly at 
their  neighbours  –  what  now  we  would  call 
internal  European  policy,  matter  for  the 
European Council. Security and defence policy 
as well as most of foreign policy was left to the 
US via the intermediary of NATO. Europeans 
were requested to shoulder a fair share of the 
burden  in  terms  of  military  capabilities.  In 
terms  of  strategy,  European  input  was 
negligible.  In  this  distinctive  international 
context the “Méthode Monnet” proved to be 
effective. Though integration had its ups and 
downs, substantial progress was made in many 
areas.  At  least  in  one  area  the  EU  became  a 
global actor: foreign trade.  
 
After  1989  suddenly  a  new  globalized  world 
came into existence. The crisis in Yugoslavia 
forced the Union to belatedly create a security 
and  defence  policy  of  its  own.  Through  the 
well-tested  method,  step  by  step  a  new 
European  policy  area  was  elaborated.  Again, 
without adopting any underpinning strategy – 
not  doing  that  was  a  vital  part  of  the 
consensus. The focus was on the creation of 
an additional instrument, by listing a series of 
limited  (and  imperfect)  military  capabilities. 
Thus  were  born  the  Common  Foreign  and 
Security Policy and the Common Security and 
Defence Policy.  
Other policy areas which under the pressure of 
globalization  gradually  evolved  towards  the 
European  level  were  dealt  with  in  a  similar 
way:  ad  hoc,  tentatively,  and  imperfectly, 
without meeting any overall strategic objective. 
Energy and migration policy, or what passes as 
such, are just two examples. All of this does 
not go unnoticed by the European citizen. The 
attractive  story  of  a  Union  that  renders  war 
within  Europe  impossible,  has  had  its  day. 
What does the Union stand for today, in this 
new world?  
 
If one asks individual citizens in other parts of 
the world, the answer steadfastly is: its social 
and  economic  model.  Many  an  economic 
refugee aspires to join it. Citizens in the new 
Member  States  rightfully  aspired  to  enjoy  a 
similar social model in their own countries as 
“The  attractive  story  of  a  Union 
that  renders  war  within  Europe 
impossible, has had its day. What 
does the Union stand for today, in 
this new world?”   3 
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quickly  as  possible.  What  keeps  together  the 
multitude of citizens that have now been living 
in  the  EU  for  many  years,  is  their  desire  to 
safeguard their specific national social model in 
the face of globalization. If the EU is criticized 
by its citizens, it is because of the perception 
that the Union does not manage to achieve this, 
as a consequence of fragmented and imperfect 
policies, or even worse, that the Union itself is 
part cause of the downgrading of the European 
way of life. So, one need not look further to 
find a new attractive narrative for the EU. But 
in a globalized world all global actors operate in 
function  of  their  national  interests  and  a 
strategy  based  thereon,  so  as  to  position 
themselves  advantageously  on  the  global 
chessboard. In such a context, the Union can 
no  longer  allow  itself  to  operate  in  ad  hoc 
manner, to play just ping pong, if it hopes to 
achieve any strategic objective.  
In spite of its history, crafting a fully-fledged 
strategy need not be an impassable obstacle for 
the Union, because it already possesses all the 
required  building-blocks.  The  Lisbon  Treaty 
already refers to the norms and values of the 
Union,  and  specifically  to  its  social  and 
economic  model.  Furthermore,  the  notion  of 
strategy is no longer taboo since in 2003 Javier 
Solana,  the  then  High  Representative, 
published  the  European  Security  Strategy.  At 
the  time,  this  was  a  daring  initiative,  with 
Solana  estimating  very  astutely  how  far  he 
could  go,  having  in  mind  the  history  of  the 
coming into being of CSDP. The role of a High 
Representative  is  not  to  wait  until, 
spontaneously,  a  consensus  emerges  between 
the Member States and to act only then. It is to 
take  the  initiative,  in  function  of  common 
interests, including in so-called taboo areas. In 
the end, the ESS at the time was welcomed by 
all  Member  States  and,  importantly,  by  the 
European Parliament. The ESS mostly outlines 
general  principles  about  how  the  EU  should 
respond  to  international  events:  preventively; 
holistically, using all instruments at its disposal, 
and multilaterally, working with partners. These 
principles  remain  fully  relevant.  But  honesty 
forces to admit that the ESS is but the first step 
towards  a  fully-fledged  strategy.  It  does 
constitute the foundation on which can now be 
built.  
 
The ESS was crafted as a European response to 
the  US  doctrine  which  the  Bush 
administration  published  after  the 
invasion of Iraq. Since then, the US has 
substantially  revised  its  National 
Security Strategy on several occasions. 
In  Europe  too,  voices  are  now  rising 
calling for the ESS to be completed. As 
yet  there  is  no  consensus.  An  earlier 
attempt,  in  2008,  to  launch  this 
strategic  debate  ended  in  complete 
failure.  The  political  context,  at  a 
moment when ratification of the Lisbon Treaty 
was  as  yet  incomplete,  was  simply  not 
beneficial. It was probably for the better that 
with  the  adoption  of  the  Report  on  the 
Implementation  of  the  ESS  the  whole  thing 
ended with a non-event. A real revision of the 
ESS under such adverse circumstances carried 
the  risk  of  ending  up  with  a  lower  level  of 
ambition than in 2003. But 2012 is not 2008. It 
should come as no surprise therefore that the 
political will to revise the ESS is steadily rising. 
Yet in many capitals reluctance remains, which 
has  led  to  the  plea  certainly  not  to  be  too 
ambitious.  At  most  a  limited  series  of  sub-
“What  keeps  together  the 
multitude  of  citizens  living  in  the 
EU,  is  their  desire  to  safeguard 
their specific national social model 
in the face of globalization.”   4 
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strategies could be developed, on energy security 
for  example,  without  revising  the  overarching 
strategy, the ESS. So, a return to the “Méthode 
Monnet”. This is an option, of course – but a 
suboptimal one. It runs contrary to the holistic 
approach  on  which  the  EU  prides  itself,  and 
which is one of the core principles of the ESS to 
which all Member States have subscribed. And 
there is more.  
 
A  coherent  foreign  and  security  policy  is 
indissolubly  linked  to  domestic  policy. 
Safeguarding  and  enhancing  the  social  and 
economic model of the Member States requires 
that  the  Union  takes  the  necessary  flaking 
measures,  internally  as  well  as  externally.  The 
Member  States,  the  Commission,  and  the 
European Parliament all have a crucial role to 
play  in  this.  Only  if  there  is  clarity  about  the 
overall  objective,  can  a  coherent  strategy  be 
designed,  and  from  there  on  sub-strategies 
adopted,  such  as  on  energy,  migration,  the 
neighbourhood,  external  trade,  and  even 
external action in general, including if and when 
necessary collective action for crisis management 
by the Member States and the Union as such. 
Such a strategy must go further than the current 
ESS.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  say  how  to  act,  it 
should stipulate the why, and then who does what, 
when,  and  by  which  means?  This  is  no  mere 
theoretical  exercise.  Practice  teaches  that 
collective action is only undertaken if there is a 
sufficient  prior  consensus  about  the  overall 
objective, the principles, and the general way of 
acting. In other words, if there is a consensus 
on  strategy.  Only  then  does  a  feeling  of 
ownership emerge, and is every actor ready to 
effectively implement its part of the workload, 
to show solidarity.  
 
And so we have come full circle. Only thus can 
an end be made to the ad hoc-ery that currently 
rules  the  Union  and  is  the  cause  of  internal 
tensions. Those who claim that the EU should 
now focus exclusively on the internal issues of 
the  Euro,  savings,  and  growth,  and  that  a 
security strategy can wait, are seeing just one 
tree  but  are  missing  the  forest.  Without  a 
consensus  on  the  overall  objective,  any 
consensus on internal policies will be slow in 
the making. Meanwhile, any coherent external 
action is missing, as the reaction to the Arab 
Spring  has  made  painfully  clear.  The  short 
term  impact  of  this  situation  we  are  already 
experiencing.  The  long  term  social  and 
economic  impact  will  be  considerable.  Crisis 
management  in  Libya  also  demonstrates  the 
price  of  the  absence  of  strategy,  in  very 
concrete terms. A limited number of Member 
States took the lead, but the Union as such was 
invisible,  even  with  its  timid  attempt 
to  mount  a  humanitarian  CSDP 
operation in the margin of the military 
operations. The strength of a strategy 
is  that  is  unites.  Without  it,  one 
blunders. It is not sufficient to see the 
trees. The forest matters too.  
 
How  to  arrive  at  a  more  complete 
strategy? Clearly, an intergovernmental 
conference or the formula of the Convention 
cannot work, as the building-blocks of such a 
strategy  are  already  incorporated  in  the 
Treaties.  What  matters  now  is  to  provide 
horizontal  guidance  to  the  various  European 
actors, in a matrix-like approach, in conformity 
with the Treaty texts. The most apt formula 
therefore  is  the  one  followed  by  Solana  in 
2003.  But  because  this  time  the  undertaking 
“It  is  not  sufficient  to  say  how t o  
act, it should stipulate the why, and 
then who does what, when, and by 
which means?”   5 
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has  a  broader  scope,  comprising  both  internal 
and external security, it seems wise to entrust the 
task  to  a  triumvirate:  the  President  of  the 
European  Council,  the  President  of  the 
European  Commission,  and  the  High 
Representative,  together  with  the  European 
Parliament  also,  where  there  is  appetite  for 
strategic  debate,  can  start  an  intense  dialogue 
with  the  Member  States.  It  is  not  just  about 
approving  a  document.  The  key  is  joint 
ownership and collective action.  
 
The benchmark to judge the outcome of such a 
process  is  the  following  reality  check:  Is  the 
Union  capable  of  sufficiently  supporting  the 
Member States to build a national social model, 
without internal competition, strong enough to 
survive  in  a  globalized  world?  Is  the  strategy 
credible, within the Union and globally? In other 
words, is there a new attractive narrative?  
 
A  sense  of  urgency  is  always  required  if  one 
wants to introduce sensitive change in a complex 
environment.  The  world  around  us  is  moving 
fast. The urgency is real, but the end product is 
more  important  than  the  timing.  2013,  ten 
years  after  an  audacious  Solana:  an  equally 
audacious Ashton, Barroso and Van Rompuy? 
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